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Federal Court Self-Preservation and Terri
Schiavo
JACK

M. BEERMANNt

INTRODUCTION

If the federal court in Florida had granted preliminary
relief to allow itself more time to consider the constitutional
claims that Terri Schiavo's parents brought on her behalf,
and if, as expected, those claims were ultimately rejected,
the federal court would have been placed in the unenviable
position of having to be the institution that made the final
decision to terminate Terri Schiavo's feeding and other
treatment. Although I have no way of knowing whether this
fact, which has not been noted in the commentary,' actually
entered into the mind of any of the federal judges who
considered the case, in my view it goes a long way toward
explaining why the federal court did not grant preliminary
relief. I suspect that the federal judges involved in the case
simply did not want to be in the position of having to issue
an order that would be widely seen as the order that

t Professor of Law and Harry Elwood Warren Scholar, Boston University
School of Law. Thanks to Ward Farnsworth, Gary Lawson, and Ken Simons for
comments on earlier drafts and to Rachel Studinski for research assistance.
1. The closest I have seen to a reference to this factor is in Adam M.
Samaha, Undue Process: CongressionalReferral and Judicial Resistance in the
Schiavo Controversy, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 505, 509 (2005), in which Professor
Samaha notes that "federal courts have a (part-time) tradition of hesitation in
controversial cases." In his contribution to the same symposium in which
Professor Samaha's paper appeared, Sam Bagenstos accused the federal courts
of being unduly hasty, but the primary reason he discerned for the haste was
that perhaps "the federal judges assigned to the case perceived the equities as
strongly tilting in favor of ending the litigation as soon as possible." See Samuel
R. Bagenstos, Judging the Schiavo Case, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 457, 469 (2005).
Professor Bagenstos also suggests that the federal judges may have been
motivated by an "impulse to stand up to the political pressure," an "impulse to
defend the work of the state courts" and "the general disinclination of federal
judges to hear cases that feel like 'family law."' Id. at 473, 473 n.73.
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resulted in the final removal of Terri Schiavo's feeding tube
which, in turn, resulted in her death.
The federal court's posture in this regard is perfectly
understandable. In light of the strident attacks on the
federal trial and appellate court that were forthcoming
after they declined to intervene, imagine the reaction had a
federal court ordered preliminary relief and then later
issued an order that, in effect, resulted in the removal of
Terri Schiavo's feeding tube. It is the hope of this Essay
that viewing the case from this perspective sheds new light
on Congress's intervention into the case and on the federal
judiciary's reaction to that intervention.
I.

TERRI SCHIAVO, HER STATUTE, AND FEDERAL COURT
PROCEEDINGS UNDER IT

The sad facts about the end of Terri Schiavo's life are
well known, and I will not recount them here except in the
barest detail. 2 In 1990, when she was twenty-six years old,
Terri Schiavo suffered cardiac arrest and lapsed into what
doctors described as a "persistent vegetative state." She was
kept alive with a tube that supplied food and water. After
seven years, Mrs. Schiavo's husband sought to have the
feeding tube removed, which, under Florida law, because
Mrs. Schiavo did not leave written instructions, required a
judicial finding by clear and convincing evidence that Terri
Schiavo would not want to be kept alive in her condition.
Mrs. Schiavo's parents, the Schindlers, opposed Mr.
Schiavo's request, and the litigation over whether to remove
the feeding tube spanned another seven years. The Florida
state courts ultimately sided with Mr. Schiavo, and after
many appeals and attempted intervention by the
legislature and Governor of Florida, on March 18, 2005, the
feeding tube was removed pursuant to court order.
On March 21, 2005, Congress passed, and the President
signed, "An Act For the Relief of the Parents of Theresa
Marie
Schiavo." 3 This extraordinary
statute gave
jurisdiction to a federal court in Florida to hear any federal
2. These facts are drawn from Edward J. Larson, From Cruzan to Schiavo:
Similar Bedfellows in Fact and at Law, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 405, 406 (2005).
3. Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005) [hereinafter "the Act" or "Terri's
Law"].
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constitutional or statutory claims Terri Schiavo might have,
and granted her parents standing to bring those claims.
The Act instructed the federal district court to decide Terri
Schiavo's claims "de novo

. .

. notwithstanding any prior

State court determination and regardless of whether such a
claim has previously been raised, considered, or decided in
State court proceedings." 4 Congress was also adamant that
the federal court decide the case without regard to any
prudential grounds for deference to ongoing state court
proceedings, providing that "[t]he District Court shall
entertain and determine the suit without any delay or
abstention in favor of State court proceedings, and
available in the State courts
regardless of whether remedies
5
have been exhausted."
The Act was also clear about remedies. Section 3
provided that:
After a determination of the merits of a suit brought under
this Act, the District Court shall issue such declaratory and
injunctive relief as may be necessary to protect the rights of
Theresa Marie Schiavo under the Constitution and laws of the
United States relating to the withholding or withdrawal6 of food,
fluids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain her life.

On the matter of rights, Congress was clear that it was
not creating any. In section 5 of the Act, Congress specified
that "[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to create
rights not otherwise secured by the
substantive
laws of the United States or of the several
and
Constitution
7
States."
Shortly (within hours) after the Act became law, the
Schindlers filed suit on Terri's behalf in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida, alleging
numerous constitutional and statutory violations and
seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. On
March 22, 2005, one day after the Act became law, the
district court denied all relief, including a temporary order
which would have required the reinsertion of the feeding

4. Id. § 2.
5. Id.

6. Id. § 3.
7. Id. § 5.
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tube while the court considered the merits of the case. In a
key legal conclusion, the district court found that nothing in
the Act altered the traditional requirements for granting
preliminary relief. The court stated:
A district court may grant a preliminary injunction only if the
moving party shows that:
(1) it has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues;
(3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever
damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party;
and
(4) if issued,
the injunction would not be adverse to the public
8
interest.

Although the federal court found that factors two,
three, and four weighed in favor of granting preliminary
relief-especially factor two, that Terri would suffer
irreparable harm (death) if preliminary relief were deniedit found that the Schindlers did not establish a sufficient
likelihood of success on the merits to warrant preliminary
relief.9
To decide whether a preliminary injunction was
warranted, in its opinion issued the day after the case
began, the district court analyzed numerous constitutional
claims raised on Terri's behalf, and found them all
wanting. 10 The next day, one day after the district court
denied preliminary relief, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision" and denied rehearing en banc,' 2 finding no
abuse of discretion in the district court's determination that
the Schindlers had not demonstrated a sufficient likelihood

8. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1383 (M.D.
Fla. 2005), aff'd 403 F.3d 1223, reh'g denied, 403 F.3d 1261, stay denied, 544

U.S. 945 (2005).
9. Id.

10. Id. at 1384-88.
11. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir.
2005), reh'g denied, 403 F.3d 1261, stay denied, 544 U.S. 945 (2005).
12. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2005)
(denying rehearing en banc), stay denied, 544 U.S. 945 (2005).
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of success on the merits to justify preliminary relief.13
Again, the key ruling by the court of appeals, which was
made after an examination of the legislative history of the
Act which discussed the precise issue, was that the Act had
14
not modified the standard for granting preliminary relief.
The day after that the Supreme Court of the United States
denied a stay of the lower court's order pending the
submission of a petition for certiorari. 15 In the meanwhile,
the Schindlers had filed an amended complaint and request
for preliminary relief, raising additional constitutional and
statutory claims. Preliminary relief under this complaint
was denied by both the district court 16 and court of
appeals 17 on March 25, 2005. Rehearing and rehearing en
banc were denied on March 30, 2005,18 and that same day
the Supreme Court once again denied a stay of the lower
court's order pending certiorari.' 9 Thus, all litigation under
Terri's Law was completed in nine short days. Terri Schiavo
died on March 31, 2005.
II. CRITICISM OF THE FEDERAL COURT'S ACTIONS UNDER
TERRI'S LAW

The federal courts were swiftly and strongly condemned
for their handling of the litigation brought by the
Schindlers on behalf of Terri. 20 The principal criticism,
made in the media and in a dissenting opinion in the court
of appeals, was that the federal courts rushed to judgment
for no reason, since Terri Schiavo was not in immediate
13. 403 F.3d at 1226.
14. Id. at 1227-28.

15. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 544 U.S. 945 (2005).
16. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (M.D. Fla.),
aff'd, 403 F.3d 1289 (lth Cir.) (per curiam), reh'g denied, 404 F.3d 1282 (11th
Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 404 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir.), stay denied, 544 U.S. 957

(2005).
17. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir.) (per
curiam), reh'g denied, 404 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 404 F.3d
1270 (11th Cir.), stay denied, 544 U.S. 957 (2005).
18. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir.), reh'g en
banc denied, 404 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir.), stay denied, 544 U.S. 957 (2005).
19. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 544 U.S. 957 (2005).
20. See, e.g., William Yardley, On the Day After, Attending to the Details of
Death, N.Y. TIMES, April 2, 2005, at A8.
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danger at the time treatment and feeding were halted and
certainly would have lived long enough to allow for more
careful deliberation-if only the federal courts had ordered
preliminary relief that would have resulted in the
temporary reinsertion of the feeding tube.
This criticism was accompanied by a charge that the
courts had, in effect, thumbed their noses at Congress. As
Judge Wilson stated in dissent at the Court of Appeals:
The entire purpose for the statute was to give the federal courts an
opportunity to consider the merits of Plaintiffs' constitutional
claims with a fresh set of eyes. Denial of Plaintiffs' petition cuts
sharply against that intent, which is evident to me from the
language of the statute, as well as the swift and unprecedented
manner of its enactment. Theresa Schiavo's death, which is
imminent, effectively ends the litigation without a fair opportunity
to fully consider the merits of Plaintiffs' constitutional claims ....
.. [R]efusing to grant the equitable relief would, through
Theresa Schiavo's death, moot the case and eliminate federal
jurisdiction. This deprivation would directly contravene Congress's21
recent enactment granting jurisdiction in this case.

The reaction to the federal courts' inaction was
extreme. Then-House Majority Leader Tom Delay
threatened the federal judges involved in the case with
impeachment, declaring "[t]his loss happened because our
legal system did not protect the people who need protection
most, and that will change. The time will come for the men
responsible for this to answer for their behavior, but not
today. ' 22 Calls for impeachment of the federal judges
involved were widespread. The director of the Christian
Defense Coalition was quoted as saying "[i]mpeachment of
federal judges needs to be put on the table and needs to be
discussed." 23 A web commentator stated that "every federal
judge involved in the execution of Terri Schiavo has
violated his/her office as judge and has committed the high
crime of being an accessory to murder. Therefore every
21. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1237-39 (11th Cir.)
(Wilson, J., dissenting); see also Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 466-73.
22. Bill Sammon, Pro-Lifers Hear Call to Overhaul 'Arrogant" Judiciary,
WASH. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at Al.

23. Yardley, supra note 20.
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judge so tainted must be impeached by Congress and
removed from the bench. ' 24 The author of these words
posted a paper on the internet linking the Schiavo decision
to the Dred Scott case. 25 Ironically, the federal courts that
declined to intervene were charged with "judicial activism"
on the ground that Congress intended for them to get
involved by deciding the merits, and acting contrary to
Congress's clearly expressed intent was activist.
A premise of this criticism appears to be that it would
have been relatively costless for the federal court to issue a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction
staying the effectiveness of the state court decision ordering
the removal of the feeding tube. The main purpose of this
Essay is to dispute that point. There are several important
factors to keep in mind in this regard. First, this was not a
situation in which preliminary relief would have merely
maintained the status quo. By the time the case reached
the federal court, the status quo had been altered by the
state court that ordered the removal of Terri Schiavo's
feeding tube. At this point, a federal court order suspending
the effectiveness of the state court order would have altered
26
the status quo by requiring the reinsertion of the tube.
Second, and obviously related, the federal judges who
heard Terri Schiavo's case must have known full well that if
they granted preliminary relief, it would be they, and not
the state judge, who would appear to have ordered the final
removal of the feeding tube. Although technically the
federal judge would be merely allowing the state court's
order to take effect, that technicality would not conceal the
fact that the removal of the reinserted tube would be the
direct result of an order by a federal court, either the
district court or court of appeals, when it rejected Terri
Schiavo's claims on the merits.

24. Gary Amos, Impeach all Judges in the Terri Schiavo Case (2005),
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1380607/posts (emphasis in original).
25. See Gary Amos, Dred Scott and Terri Schiavo: The Long and Tortured
Death of the 14th Amendment At the Hands of the Federal Judiciary (2005),
http://www.therealitycheck.org/GuestColumnist/dredscott-terrischiavo-4.pdf.
26. The court of appeals understood that preliminary relief would have
altered rather than preserved the status quo because it would have required the
reinsertion of the feeding tube. See 403 F.3d at 1225 n.1.
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Viewed in this light, the stress the federal courts placed
on the "probability of success on the merits" prong of the
requirements for ordering preliminary relief makes sense.
Had the federal court been acting before the tube had been
removed, an order preserving the status quo would have
had a relatively minor impact. Given that Terri Schiavo had
been on life support for fifteen years, allegedly against what
she would have wanted, a few more weeks or months while
the federal courts heard and decided the merits of the
constitutional claims raised by her parents would not have
been such a great intrusion on her autonomy. Once the tube
was removed, the stakes were much higher, because the
federal court would have been, in effect, ordering the
reinsertion of the tube. 27 Any such order would have placed
the federal court in the awkward position of being the last
actor before the feeding tube was removed once and for all.
In light of these consequences, it would be
understandable if the federal court, without explicitly
changing the standard, required a higher probability of
success on the merits than usual. This, of course, opened
the court's decision to criticism from the supporters of
Terri's Law who had expected, or at least hoped, that Terri
Schiavo would be kept alive while the court considered the
constitutional claims brought on her behalf. But the court
may have anticipated even greater criticism if, after
granting preliminary relief, its dissolution of a preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order had been the
immediate cause of Terri Schiavo's death.
III. SHOULD THE FEDERAL JUDGES HAVE REACTED AS THEY
DID?

Suppose I am correct that the federal judges hearing
Terri Schiavo's case refused to grant preliminary relief to
allow for a fuller, calmer consideration of the merits of the
constitutional claims brought on Terri Schiavo's behalf to
avoid having to issue the final order that would result in
27. Even though reinsertion would have been more intrusive than an order
that resulted in simply maintaining preexisting treatment, the district court
explicitly found that reinsertion was not so intrusive as to preclude preliminary
relief. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1383 (M.D.
Fla. 2005) ("To the extent Defendants urge that Theresa Schiavo would be
harmed by the invasive procedure reinserting the feeding tube, this court finds
that death outweighs any such harm.").
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the removal of Terri Schiavo's feeding tube. Suppose further
that one reason for this reluctance was fear of the reaction
to such an order, perhaps combined with a feeling that it
was improper for Congress to drop the matter in the lap of
the federal courts without providing any substantive
guidance at all. The question then becomes whether this is
legitimate behavior for a federal court. Should a federal
court take into account the public reaction to its rulings?
Stated this way, it seems that the answer is an easy "no." It
is contrary to the ideal of justice for a court to take into
account the reaction to its rulings, and the constitutional
guarantees of independence enjoyed by federal judges are
designed to immunize them from these types of
considerations. The ideal is for judges to decide based only
on the merits of the case before them. Fiat justitia, ruat
coelum, even if, when the heavens descend, the wrath of the
world is visited upon the deciding judges.
As is so often true, things are not so simple. Do we
really want or expect judges to decide all cases without
regard to the popular reaction to their decisions? I think
not, and there are prudential doctrines of judicial selfgovernance that can be explained, at least in part, by fear of
damage to the status of the judicial system that can result
from a perception that the judiciary has made decisions
that overstep the bounds of what is viewed as appropriate
judicial behavior.
One argument against the propriety of the federal court
avoiding a complete consideration of Terri Schiavo's case is
that Congress clearly instructed it to reach the merits of the
claims. Congress declared: "The District Court shall
entertain and determine the suit without any delay or
abstention in favor of State court proceedings." 28 This is the
provision that the federal court is most clearly charged with
violating-if not in letter, at least in spirit. Congress also
wrote its remedial provision on the assumption that the
federal court would reach the merits of Mrs. Schiavo's
claims: "After a determinationof the merits of a suit brought
under this Act, the District Court shall issue such
declaratory and injunctive relief as may be necessary to
protect the rights of Theresa Marie Schiavo .... -29 These
28. Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 2, 119 Stat. 15, 15 (2005).
29. Id. § 3 (emphasis supplied).
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provisions counsel strongly against any attempt by the
court to avoid reaching the merits for prudential or other
reasons.
Despite the strength of the implications of the foregoing
statutory provisions, Terri Schiavo's case presented
problems that counseled in favor of judicial restraint. The
first problem is that, while Congress ordered the federal
court to decide the case, it explicitly disavowed any intent
to create substantive law. In section 5 of the Act, in
somewhat illogical fashion, Congress declared: "Nothing in
this Act shall be construed to created substantive rights not
otherwise secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States or of the several States. '' 30 (Illogical because
the language implies that the Act does create rights that
are otherwise secured, a logical impossibility since, if they
are otherwise secured, Congress obviously did not create
them in the Act.) This placed the federal court under
compulsion to decide a case in a very unsettled area of the
law. While some people might confidently assert that Terri
Schiavo's federal rights were violated, 31 I daresay that for

30. Id. § 5.
31. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Killing Terri Schiavo, 22 CONST.
COMMENT. 585 (2005). Professor Paulsen argues that because the structure of
Florida law places the state court in the position of, in effect, ordering the
killing of a patient, the Constitution requires that the court employ the criminal
law's "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. While Professor Paulsen presents a
compelling case for extreme judicial care in dealing with the lives of people like
Terri Schiavo, I am not so confident that he correctly states an established
principle of constitutional law. I also note that, although the Florida court in
Mrs. Schiavo's case appears to have relied on relatively flimsy evidence to
conclude that, by clear and convincing evidence, she would have been against
continued treatment, Florida's definition of "clear and convincing evidence"
appears to be close to, but not quite, a civil equivalent of "beyond a reasonable
doubt." See 0. Carter Snead, The (Surprising)Truth about Schiavo: A Defeat for
the Cause of Autonomy, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 391, 394-404 (2005); see also
In re Davey, 645 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1994):
There must be more than a "preponderance of the evidence," but the
proof need not be "beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt."
This intermediate level of proof entails both a qualitative and
quantitative standard. The evidence must be credible; the memories of
the witnesses must be clear and without confusion; and the sum total
of the evidence must be of sufficient weight to convince the trier of fact
without hesitancy. "[C]lear and convincing evidence requires that the
evidence must be found to be credible; the facts to which the witnesses
testify must be distinctly remembered; the testimony must be precise
and explicit and the witnesses must be lacking in confusion as to the
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most of us there is a great deal of uncertainty over whether
Florida's scheme or its application to Terri Schiavo's
situation violated, or even came close to violating, any
recognized constitutional right.
Congress's failure to create substantive rights coupled
with the lack of clarity of any preexisting constitutional
rights 32 amounted to an instruction to the federal court to
engage in the sort of judicial activism for which federal
courts are so often condemned. It should not be surprising
that the federal judges' reactions to this were decidedly
negative. Here is the conservative legal community, they
might think, usually against judicial activism, egging us on
to create new rights on behalf of a dying adult when they
condemn us if we create new rights for other groups that
suffer from discrimination or government overreaching. If
for no other reason than the ability to think, if not say,
"gotcha," a federal judge might be extremely reluctant to
create new rights in this area in light of the decades of
criticism federal courts have endured for creating rights in
other areas. Congress was inviting the federal court to stick
its neck out and create a new right when members of
Congress are often among the federal courts' most vocal
critics when they do just that.
The reaction might have been different had Congress
specified a legal standard for the federal court to use in
deciding the case. Congress might have adopted Michael
Paulsen's standard and stated, as enforcement of the due

facts in issue. The evidence must be of such weight that it produces in
the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction, without
hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established."
Id. at 404 (quoting Slomowitz v. Walker, 429 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983)) (internal citation omitted).
In the Schiavo case itself, while the Florida appellate court did not define
"clear and convincing evidence," it characterized the standard as very high and
stated that in such cases there should be a preference for maintaining life. See
Schindler v. Schiavo (In re Schiavo), 780 So. 2d 176, 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001) ("In making this difficult decision, a surrogate decision-maker should err
on the side of life .... In cases of doubt, we must assume that a patient would
choose to defend life in exercising his or her right of privacy." (quoting In re
Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989))).
32. See, e.g., Samaha, supra note 1, at 509.

564

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

process clause, 33 that "the federal court shall order the
reinstatement and continuation of life-saving treatment,
including feeding and hydration, unless it appears beyond a
reasonable doubt that cessation of such treatment would
have been Terri Schiavo's wishes in this situation." Under
that standard the federal court might have ordered that
treatment be maintained, but if the federal court had still
decided against relief, at least blame would have been
shared with Congress, since the court's opinion presumably
would have concluded that under the legal standard
specified by Congress, the Schindlers were not entitled to
relief.
Accepted doctrines of judicial self-restraint reveal other
areas in which federal judges are sensitive to the reactions
others might have to their rulings. For example, in an
article I published almost twenty years ago, I argued that
abstention doctrines can be understood, against the charge
that abstention intrudes on Congress's power to regulate
the jurisdiction of the federal courts, at least in part. as
matters of judicial self-preservation. 34 The argument is
similar to the primary reason attributed to the veto power.
The President's veto power is primarily designed to provide
him with the ability to resist laws that intrude on his
powers. It is only secondarily about adding a 35
national
perspective designed to improve the quality of laws.
Federal courts may need an effective mechanism to
prevent Congress from dropping every controversial matter
in their laps. This is especially true when, as with Terri's
Law, Congress hands the courts the hot potato without
substantive guidance, making any decision on the merits a
responsibility of the federal courts alone. If the federal
courts are overloaded with controversial cases, they may
not have the political capital necessary when a strong
independent court is most needed, i.e., when a federal court
33. Whether such a statute is within Congress's power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment is unclear. See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997).
34. See generally Jack M. Beermann, "Bad"Judicial Activism and Liberal
Federal-Courts Doctrine: A Comment on Professor Doernberg and Professor
Redish, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1053 (1990).

35. See THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961); see also J. Richard Broughton, Rethinking the Presidential
Veto, 42 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 91, 102-03 (2005).
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is called upon to protect federal rights against the clearly
expressed will of Congress, the President, or both in areas
such as civil rights enforcement or constitutional voting
rights. Abstention and related doctrines such as the
preference against deciding constitutional cases provide the
courts with mechanisms for regulating their agenda to
preserve the political capital of the federal courts. 36 The
underlying idea is that the reaction of the political
community to controversial decisions may reduce the
federal courts' ability to act in the future.
Similarly, doctrines aimed at avoiding friction with
states, state courts, and state policies 37 are concerned, at
least in part, with the reactions of others (such as judges on
those state courts) to federal court decisions. 83 Friction with
state courts arises most strongly when federal courts
intervene into ongoing state proceedings, but it is also a
concern
anytime
federal
courts
evaluate
the
constitutionality of state practices, construe unclear state
law, or reexamine matters that have been previously
litigated in the state courts. The Supreme Court has shaped
abstention and related doctrines to avoid federal-state
friction by minimizing confrontations between the federal
39
courts and state governments, including the state courts.
The Supreme Court itself is so concerned that, when it
reverses a state court, its instructions on remand are
36. As Hart & Wechsler's Federal Courts casebook explains, in recounting
the discussion of constitutional avoidance in Alexander Bickel's The Least
Dangerous Branch, "[a]ccording to Bickel, this technique of constitutional
avoidance is necessary to accommodate the Court's role as the ultimate enforcer
of constitutional 'principle' with competing demands of 'prudence' and
expediency that counsel the Court sometimes to avoid constitutional decisions
that aroused political constituencies would be unwilling to accept." Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., et al, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 87 (5th ed. 2003) (citing ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 127 (1962)). Fallon also

notes that judicial exercise of this power is not without its critics, including
Gerald Gunther, who termed it "the neo-Brandeisian fallacy." Id.
37. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971); Railroad Comm'n v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941).
38. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973) (discussing habeas
corpus exhaustion requirement as avoiding potential friction arising from
federal court scrutiny of state court procedures).
39. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379-81 (1976) (discussing federal court
restraint when called upon to issue injunctions affecting the administration of
state criminal justice).
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gentler than when it reverses a federal court, telling the
state court that further proceedings should be "not
inconsistent" with its opinion in the case, rather than
ordering further proceedings "consistent" with its opinion as
it does with federal courts.
In another context, members of the Supreme Court
have expressed the view that the very legitimacy of the
Supreme Court depends on how its decisions are received
by the public at large. In their joint opinion declining to
overrule decisions protecting the right to abortion, three
Justices explained: "the Court's legitimacy depends on
making legally principled decisions under circumstances in
which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to
be accepted by the Nation." 40 While this may seem to some
a shockingly low standard of legitimacy, if failure to adhere
to precedent is perceived by federal judges as a potential
threat to the public's acceptance of court decisions as
authoritative, so might a decision to terminate Terri
Schiavo's life support given the highly charged climate that
surrounded Congress's action on her behalf.
Owing to the provision in Terri's Law purporting to
require the federal court to decide the case without regard
to abstention in deference to state court proceedings,
abstention in name may not have been the appropriate
response. However, given the long history of federal courtcreated doctrines that manifest concern for how federal
court decisions are likely to be received, it should have come
as no surprise that the district court and court of appeals
found a way to avoid putting themselves in a position to be
the court that issued the order that removed Terri Schiavo's
life support. That the decision was based doctrinally on the
requirements for preliminary injunctive relief rather than
on an abstention doctrine is not important. What is
important is that the federal courts, trial and appellate,
avoided taking action that would have ultimately subjected
them to even more disdain than they must have known
they would provoke by quickly denying preliminary relief.
In a sense, the standard for granting preliminary relief
functioned in Terry Schiavo's case as a sort of abstention
doctrine. In many cases, the denial of preliminary relief is
simply a strong signal to the applicant that his or her
40. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 836 (1992).

2006] FEDERAL COURT SELF-PRESERVATION

567

resources might be put to better use than pursuing the
litigation, especially when the denial is based on the court's
conclusion that the plaintiff has not demonstrated sufficient
likelihood of success on the merits. Terri Schiavo's case may
be an extreme example of a different basis for denying
preliminary relief, to protect the federal court from
entanglement in a messy situation. If Terri Schiavo's claims
were destined to be rejected anyway, there was no good
reason for the federal court to get all tangled up in such a
controversial matter by ordering the reinsertion of her
feeding tube, just so the federal court would have to
dissolve the order and have the tube removed in a week, a
month, or a year.
In sum, in my view, the federal trial and appellate
courts' quick action and denial of preliminary relief can be
explained by the realization that granting preliminary
relief would have put the federal courts in the position of
being the institution that would have been perceived to
have ordered, once and for all, the removal of Terri
Schiavo's feeding tube and other life-sustaining treatment.
It should be no surprise that the federal courts were
anxious to avoid the great controversy that would have
arisen in that event. As a final pass at considering whether
federal courts should be concerned with the reaction to their
decisions, I offer a few reasons for a modest conclusion in
the courts' favor. First and foremost, as the famous
statement attributed to President Andrew Jackson
illuminates, 41 the federal courts depend on the Executive
Branch to enforce their judgments. More generally, the
courts need the cooperation of the other branches to
function, whether it involves adequate funding from
Congress, adequate protection from the U.S. Marshalls, or
cooperation from the Department of Justice and its U.S.
Attorneys. It would not be a positive development if the
federal courts were under constant attack and isolation
within the government. Finally, while there is no question
that the insulation of the federal courts is in many respects
important to the maintenance of the federal courts as a

41. In speaking about the decision of the Supreme Court in Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), which held that states have no power to regulate
within the territory of Indian tribes, President Jackson is reputed to have
stated: "John Marshall has made his decision: now let him enforce it!" See 1
HORACE GREELEY, THE AMERICAN CONFLICT 106 (1864) (emphasis omitted).
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check on the activities of the other branches, complete
insulation from public concern over the effect of court
decisions would probably not be a good thing. Courts ought
to be concerned, at least to some extent, that their decisions
have, and are perceived as having, positive social effects.
CONCLUSION

Terri Schiavo's possible suffering and the certainty of
her impending death created compelling reasons to err on
the side of caution when adjudicating her fate. Had the
state court order to remove her feeding tube not been
carried out by the time Congress passed Terri's law, and
her parents had brought the case to federal court, the
federal court may have been much more willing to freeze
matters until it could hear and decide Terri's claims in a
calm, sober manner. However, that was not the case, and
Congress's actions caused significant difficulty for the
federal district court in Florida and the court of appeals. By
"ordering" those courts to hear and decide any federal
claims Terri might have, without specifying the substance
under which those claims should be evaluated, Congress's
actions presented a potential public relations disaster for
those courts. At the time Congress acted, and even now,
there was great uncertainty over the substance of any
potential constitutional claims Terri might have had
concerning the Florida courts' decision to allow her husband
to cease all life-sustaining measures. The federal courts
found an "out" in Congress's failure to specify a more
lenient standard for the granting of preliminary relief, and
by denying preliminary relief, they guaranteed that Terri
Schiavo would die before her claims could be fully
adjudicated. Given the reaction to what little the federal
courts did, who could blame them?

